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Abstract
This paper examines the first of William James’ Lowell lectures, the lectures that 
became his famous book Pragmatism; A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, 
and particularly the way in which that lecture connects the idea of philosophy as a 
way of life with the important role of temperament in forming philosophical systems. 
The way in which Dewey left Idealism to become James’ successor as the leader of the 
pragmatist movement is then recounted, and the way in which Dewey was already a 
philosopher of education in his idealist period is emphasized. The essay closes by ex-
plaining how neither James nor Dewey were «Rortian relativists», and by emphasizing 
James’ realism.
Key words: James, Dewey, philosophy as a way of life, role of temperament, failings 
of rationalism. Dewey as James’ successor, Dewey as philosopher of education, realism, 
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In Boston, in November and December of 1906, William James delivered the Low-
ell Lectures which were published the following year under the title, Pragmatism: a 
New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. The opening Lowell lecture bears the dry 
title, «The present dilemma in philosophy». But that lecture is anything but dry; con-
sidered on its literary merits alone, it must surely be one of the finest examples of 
philosophical prose written in this country. And its contents are certainly provocative. 
Yet it has received remarkably little discussion; even James’s most hostile critics, who 
might expect to be infuriated by it, generally pass over it in silence. I shall speculate 
about why this is the case.
But first let us say how this Lowell lecture relates to my reasons for being interested 
in James as a philosopher today. It is clear to everyone who has read James that he 
regards philosophy as something terribly important. When philosophy first separated 
*This paper originated as one of three David Ross Boyd Lectures at the University of Oklahoma, October 24, 2005. 
Although this lecture, the first of the three, is titled «The Story of Pragmatism», it might have been titled «The Story 
of James and Dewey,» because I did not talk about the third of the great «classical pragmatists», Charles S. Peirce, 
until the second lecture.
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itself off self-consciously from sophistry one of its central objectives was to provide 
rational guidance on how to live. That objective –which is James’s objective– remained 
characteristic of philosophy for many centuries. It is beautifully expressed in the fol-
lowing passage from Philo Judaeus:
«Every person –whether Greek or Barbarian– who is in training for wisdom, leading a 
blameless, irreproachable life, chooses neither to commit injustice nor return it unto 
others, but to avoid the company of busybodies, and hold in contempt the places where 
they spend their time –courts, councils, marketplaces, assemblies– in short, every kind 
of meeting of thoughtless people. As their goal is a life of peace and serenity, they 
contemplate nature and everything found within her: they attentively explore the earth, 
the sea, the air, the sky, and every nature found therein.......Such people consider the 
world as their city, and its citizens are the companions of wisdom; they have received 
their civic rights from virtue, which has been entrusted with presiding over the universal 
commonwealth. Thus, filled with every excellence, they are accustomed no longer to 
take account of physical discomforts or exterior evils, and they train themselves to be 
indifferent to indifferent things; they are armed against both pleasures and desires, 
and, in short, they always strive to keep themselves above passion..... It is obvious that 
people such as these, who find their joy in virtue, celebrate a festival their whole life 
long. To be sure, there is only a small number of such people; they are like embers of 
wisdom kept smoldering in our cities, so that virtue may not be altogether snuffed out 
and disappear from our race. But if only people everywhere felt the same way as this 
small number, and became as nature meant for them to be: blameless, irreproachable, 
and lovers of wisdom, rejoicing in the beautiful because it is beautiful, and considering 
that there is no other good besides it.... then our cities would be brimful of happiness. 
They would know nothing of the things that cause grief and fear, but would be so filled 
with the causes of joy and well being that there would not be a single moment in which 
they would not lead a life full of joyful laughter; indeed the whole cycle of the year 
would be a festival for them.»1
Commenting on this passage in a remarkable book on just this aspect of philosophy, 
Pierre Hadot writes:
«In this passage from Philo of Alexandria, inspired by Stoicism, one of the funda-
mental aspects of philosophy in the Hellenistic and Roman eras comes clearly to the 
forefront. During this period, philosophy was a way of life. This is not only to say that 
it was a specific type of moral conduct; we can easily see the role played in the passage 
from Philo by the contemplation of nature. Rather, it means that philosophy was a 
mode of existing-in-the-world, which had to be practiced at each instant, and the goal 
of which was to transform the whole of an individual’s life.
1 Philo Judaeus, On the Special Laws, 2, 44-8, quoted in Pierre Hadot, Arnold Davidson (ed), Philosophy as a Way 
of Life, Blackwell, Oxford, 1995, pp. 264-265.
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«For the ancients, the mere word philo-sophia –the love of wisdom– was enough 
to express that conception of philosophy. In the Symposium, Plato had shown that 
Socrates, symbol of the philosopher, could be identified with Eros, the son of Poros 
(expedience) and of Penia (poverty). Eros lacked wisdom, but he did know how to ac-
quire it. Philosophy thus took on the form of an exercise of the thought, will, and the 
totality of one’s being, the goal of which was to achieve a state practically inaccessible 
to mankind: wisdom. Philosophy was a method of spiritual progress which demanded 
a radical conversion and transformation of the individual’s way of being.»2
William James was certainly not a Stoic, and he did not think that wisdom was prac-
tically inaccessible to mankind; but his aim, no less than that of Philo, was to change 
our way of life as well as our way of thinking. That is why he can begin his lectures with 
a tribute to a thinker whose outlook in all other respects was diametrically opposed to 
his own: the Roman Catholic G. K. Chesterton. What Chesterton and James share is 
the conviction that philosophy «affects matters»; as Chesterton puts it, «the question 
is not whether [philosophy] affects matters, but whether in the long run anything else 
affects them.»
Perhaps here we have one of the reasons why this lecture has received so little discus-
sion. In James’s own time, «philosopher» was coming to imply «professor», and as James 
says, «Whatever universe a professor believes in must at any rate be a universe that lends 
itself to lengthy discourse.»3 Of course, James does not actually say that the professor is 
interested in lengthy discourse and not in how people should live, but very often that 
is also the case. For James, the priorities are quite different; he is not afraid of technical 
argument, but his audience is decidedly not the professoriat. When he writes that,
«Philosophy is at once the most sublime and the most trivial of human pursuits. It 
‘bakes no bread’ as has been said, but it can inspire our souls with courage; and repug-
nant as its manners, its doubting and challenging, its quibbling and dialectics, often are 
to common people, no one of us can get along without the far-flashing beams of light 
it sends over the world’s perspectives,»4 he is addressing all of us. As William James 
Earle very well put it, «James addressed himself to the people, not to other philoso-
phers, and he listened to the people to find out what life meant to them. He respected 
not so much their common sense as their common feelings and hopes and would not 
allow his philosophy to dismiss cavalierly that which figured largely in the experiences 
of men.5 In part, the professoriat has responded by discussing every aspect of James’s 
thought except his conception of what philosophy is all about!
2 Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 265. 
3 PMT [Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth, Harvard], p. 10.
4 PMT pp. 10-11.
5 «James, William», in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Macmillan, New York, 1967, volume 4, p. 241.
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But there is a second reason for the virtual silence of James’s critics about Lecture 
I. What makes this lecture so provocative is its central thesis: that philosophy is, in 
the end, a matter of temperament. If that thesis has not had the scorn poured upon it 
that has been poured upon, say, James’s theory of truth –a theory that has been badly 
misrepresented6– that is, perhaps, because it would be a little embarrassing to reply: 
«No, James: philosophy is just a matter of rational argument.» After all, if that is all 
philosophy is, it is a little mysterious why philosophical disagreement should continue 
for so long! It is, in the end, undeniable that temperament must play a large role in the 
acceptance of philosophical views. One might, of course, say that that is «true but ir-
relevant»; but that is a bit dangerous. (A little bit like saying, «My views are dictated by 
reason itself; we only have to appeal to temperament and similar psychological factors 
to explain why others are not able to see that my views are the only reasonable ones.») 
Safer to ignore this whole question!
But James’s talk of «temperament» must not be misunderstood (which is probably 
what has happened). James is not saying that philosophy is just a matter of subjective 
choice and that is the end of the matter. James also believes that there are better and 
worse temperaments. Temperaments too can be criticized. But such criticism will not 
change people at once; to affect a change in the «temper of a time» is a long slow proc-
ess. And it is in that sort of process that James is interested.
The threat of scientism and the blindness of rationalism
What concerns James, as it has concerned many other thinkers in the last two cen-
turies, is the way in which the growth in our understanding of nature, the increase in 
the sophistication and power of our natural science, has led to a loss of confidence in 
human values. «For a hundred and fifty years past,» he writes, «the progress of science 
has seemed to mean the enlargement of the material universe and the diminution of 
man’s importance. The result is what one may call the growth of naturalistic or posi-
tivistic feeling. Man is no law-giver to nature, he is an absorber. She it is who stands 
firm; he it is who must accommodate himself. Let him record truth, inhuman though 
it be, and submit to it! The romantic spontaneity and courage are gone, the vision is 
materialistic and depressing. Ideals appear as inert by-products of physiology; what 
is higher is explained by what is lower and treated forever as a case of ‘nothing but’ 
–nothing but something else of a quite inferior sort.»7 James admires the natural sci-
6 For a description of the misrepresentations see my «Comment on Robert Brandom’s paper.» Hilary Putnam: Prag-
matism and Realism, ed. Urszula M. Zeglen and James Conant, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, 59-65; for 
what I think is the right reading of James on truth, see my «James’s Theory of Truth.» The Cambridge Companion to 
William James, ed. Ruth Anna Putnam, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 166-185. 
7 PMT p. 15.
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ences, and particularly admires their love of fact, their rejection of all pretensions to a 
priori or transcendent sources of knowledge, their fallibilism and experimentalism, but 
is dismayed at the materialism and the skepticism which he sees accompanying those 
admirable traits in the case of those whom he calls «the tough-minded» (and whom we 
might today call the «scientistic»). 
At the same time, James finds no acceptable alternative in the writings of his Ideal-
ist contemporaries, who seem to him to «dwell on so high a level of abstraction that 
they never even try to come down.»8 And he sees even less hope in traditional religion, 
which he describes as «fighting a slow retreat.»9 James employs a remarkable literary 
device to dramatize the extent to which the combination of traditional theism and 
philosophical abstraction are, in his view, out of touch with the realities of life, with the 
problems that are really there for us to see, and for us to do something about.
James’s device is to use as a hideous example, not a passage from one of his Idealist 
contemporaries nor a passage from a contemporary theologian, but a passage from 
Leibnitz’s Theodicy10 (as if to say: «this temperament is always this out of touch with 
reality».) In this passage, it is assumed by Leibnitz that the number of the eternally 
damned is infinitely greater, in our human case, then the number of the saved, and 
Leibnitz reconciles this with God’s goodness by arguing, first, that the number of saved 
on other planets may be vastly greater than the number of damned, and, second, that it 
is «fitting» that «the damned draw to themselves ever new penalties by their continuing 
sins.» James’s response is memorable:
«Leibnitz’s feeble grasp of reality is too obvious to need comment from me. It is 
evident that no realistic image of the torment of a damned soul had ever approached 
the portals of his mind. Nor had it occurred to him that the smaller the number of 
‘samples’ of the genus ‘lost soul’ whom God throws as a sop to the eternal fitness, the 
more unequitably grounded is the glory of the blest. What he gives us is a cold literary 
exercise, whose cheerful substance even hell-fire does not warm.» And he adds, «And 
do not tell me that to show the shallowness of rationalist philosophizing I have had to 
go back to a shallow wigpated age. The optimism of present-day rationalism is just as 
shallow to the fact-loving mind.»11
But the fireworks are not over. To Leibnitz’s cheerful theodicy, «whose substance 
even hell-fire does not warm», James juxtaposes a description of one of the real evils 
in our own big cities: John Corcoran, a clerk, loses his position through illness, and 
«during the period of idleness his scanty savings disappeared.» Corcoran is too weak 
  8 PMT p. 16.
  9 PMT p. 16.
10 For a full reference, see PMT p. 150
11 PMT 20.
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for snow-shoveling – the only employment available. «Thoroughly discouraged, Cor-
coran returned to his home late last night to find his wife and children without food 
and the notice of dispossession on the door.» The next morning he committed suicide 
by drinking carbolic acid. (One cannot help remarking that if the present tendency 
to limit assistance to the poor continues in the United States, such stories will again 
appear in our newspapers – if they print them.) And, as if to remind us that the spirit 
of Leibnitz is still with us, James then quotes Royce and Bradley to the effect that the 
Absolute (or «the eternal order») is richer for every evil in the temporal order. 
The relation to our present-day concerns is clear. It is true that we no longer have 
around as optimistic a form of rationalism as the Absolute Idealism of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries to justify the sorts of evils James cites (although 
the celebration of «the free market» as the solution to all our problems does look suspi-
ciously like a secularized version of Leibnitz’s and Royce’s and Bradley’s theodicies.) But 
the idea that it is, in some sense, a «result of science» that objective values do not exist 
was very popular in twentieth century anglo-saxon metaphysics.12 If James promises us 
an outlook that will enable us to hold on to both our love of fact and our confidence in 
our «human values», and to do so without so transcendentalizing those values that they 
become ineffectual, he is making an offer that it would be irresponsible not to examine 
with care. And that is precisely what he does offer us:
«I offer the oddly-named thing pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy both 
kinds of demand. It can remain religious like the rationalisms, but at the same time, 
like the empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts.»13
James speaks here of pragmatism as a philosophy that can «remain religious», and 
this reflects his lifelong hope for a satisfactory philosophy of religion, but that hope is 
not one that James was able to satisfy, in my judgment at least. The great Varieties of 
Religious Experience was «intimate with facts», but, as James was well aware, the lectures 
of which that book consists dealt, apart from a few brief pages at the end, with the 
psychology of religious belief, and the question of the justification of such belief is de-
liberately postponed. Only in his final work, A Pluralistic Universe, does James attempt 
it, and that work, far from being «intimate with facts», consists largely of declarations 
about what James finds personally satisfying, with what he wishes to believe. However, 
James interest in the lectures I have been describing was not only in the clash between 
the religious and the anti-religious temperaments, but just as much in our right to 
believe that there is an objective moral order. 
Nowadays the issue is ubiquitous. Recently, for example, I read John Gardner’s novel 
12 Among the important late twentieth century philosophers who attacked the idea of objectively correct value judg-
ments one can list Simon Blackburn, Alan Gibbard, Gillbert Harman, John Mackie, and Bernard Williams; earlier, of 
course, there were the logical positivists and Charles Stevenson.
13 PMT p. 20.
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October Light. A charming device of that novel is that one of the two main characters, 
Sally, is reading a «trashy novel» pages of which are embedded in the main story. And 
in the «trashy novel» some of the characters (the evil ones, in fact) repeatedly tell us that 
we are nothing but machines. For example, a character called «Santisillia» says,
«Everything’s got to be an accident unless you decide there are gods and devils. We do 
nothing.  Peter Wagner’s uncle plows out snow and saves freezing people by pure accident, 
because he’s caught in the Sundayschool bag, or his father was a doctor, or God knows 
what. Captain Fist does all these ungodly things because it happened to rain all through 
his childhood, or his father was a drunk, or he’s an XXY, or his blood’s deficient in, say, 
riboflavin. So everybody’s a machine. An automaton, unless you decide there are gods and 
devils and there’s some magic way they can get to you.»14
So the problem that James pointed to when he wrote that to more and more peo-
ple in the preceding hundred and fifty years «Ideals appear as inert by-products of 
physiology; what is higher is explained by what is lower and treated forever as a case of 
‘nothing but’ – nothing but something else of a quite inferior sort» isn’t a problem that 
concerns only religious people. And the philosopher who more than any other secular-
ized James’s philosophical project of constructing a philosophy which respects facts 
and respects science but also respects humanistic values was John Dewey, to whom I 
now turn.
Dewey as a successor to James
Until 1903, James had thought of John Dewey primarily as an American representa-
tive of Hegelian Idealism, a sort of younger version of James’s colleague Josiah Royce. 
But in a letter to James dated March 20, 190315, Dewey writes that he is «sending you 
some proof from a forthcoming Decennial volume, Studies in Logical Theory, written 
by Moore, MacLennan Thompson Stuart, one or two others & myself as editor. You 
may not have time nor inclination to read, but I wish you would glance the pages (sic) 
enough to see whether you could stand for a dedication to yourself.» That fall James 
writes that «On returning from the country yesterday, one of the first things that greet-
ed me was your logical studies, and the to me surprising words that close its preface. 
What have I done to merit such a tribute».16 What Dewey had written was: «For both 
inspiration and the forging of the tools with which the writers have worked there is a 
14 John Gardner, October Light, , Knopf, New York 1976, pp. 324-345.
15 Collected in The Correspondence of William James, vol. 10, 1903-March 1905, pp. 214-215.
16 Letter dated October 17, 1903 Collected in The Correspondence of William James, vol. 10, 1903-March 1905, 
p. 321.
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pre-eminent obligation on the part of all of us to William James, of Harvard Univer-
sity, who, we hope, will accept this acknowledgment and this book as unworthy tokens 
of a regard and an admiration that are coequal.»17 From this point on Dewey and James 
are firm philosophical allies, and after James’s death Dewey emerges as unmistakably 
James’s successor as leader of the pragmatist school, even if he distances himself from 
James’s theological speculations.)
While Dewey’s strategies for constructing and defending a world-view which re-
spects both science and humanistic values are different from James’s, they are for the 
most part ones of which James would have approved. A principal one is to attack a 
whole series of what Dewey regarded as untenable dualisms, including facts and values, 
the mind and the body, the mind and nature, and the individual and society –all dual-
isms that James had tried to subvert. And even more than James, Dewey was a «public 
intellectual» through and through– indeed, he was to become the most famous Ameri-
can public intellectual of his time. (An excellent description of this side of Dewey can 
be found in Cornell West’s The American Evasion of Philosophy.) And above all, Dewey 
was an educator – still probably the most read educational philosopher. Indeed, Dewey 
wrote in 1916 that «if a theory makes no difference in educational endeavor, it must 
be artificial. The educational point of view enables one to envisage the philosophical 
problems where they arise and thrive, where they are at home, and where acceptance or 
rejection makes a difference in practice. If we are willing to conceive education as the 
process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, philosophy 
may even be defined as the general theory of education.»18
To give you a taste of just how Dewey practiced education, I shall quote from 
«Teaching Ethics in the High School», an essay Dewey published in Educational Re-
view in 1893.19
«Ethics, rightly conceived, is the statement of human relationships in action. In any 
right study of ethics, then, the pupil is not studying hard and fixed rules for conduct; 
he is studying the ways in which men are bound together in the complex relations of 
their interactions. He is not studying, in an introspective way, his own sentiments and 
moral attitudes; he is studying facts as objective as those of hydrostatics or the action of 
dynamos. They are subjective, too, but subjective in the sense that since the pupil himself 
is one who is bound up in the complex of action, the ethical relations have an interest 
and concern for him which no action of fluid or dynamo can possibly have. While this 
subject-matter should be taught from the lowest grade up, I shall choose an illustration of 
the mode of teaching it better adapted for high schools...
17 The Middle Works of John Dewey, vol. 2, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, 1976, pp. 296-297. 
18 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, McMillan, New York, 1916, p. 328.
19 The Early Works of John Dewey, vol. 4, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, 1976, pp. 54-61. The passage I 
quote is on pp. 56-57.
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«Let the teacher, at the outset, ask the pupils how they would decide, if a case 
of seeming misery were presented to them, whether to relieve it and, if so, how to 
relieve. This should be done without any preliminary dwelling upon the question as 
a ‘moral’ one; rather, it should be pointed out that the question is simply a practical 
one, and that ready-made moral considerations are to be put to one side. Above all, 
however, it should be made clear that the question is not what to do, but how to decide 
what to do. As this is the rock on which the method is likely to split, let me indicate 
the force of the distinction. Anyone who is acquainted with the methods in which 
the well organized Associated Charities do their work knows that they never discuss 
giving relief to someone on the basis of abstract principles of charity. They construct, 
from all the available data, an image of the case in question, and decide the particular 
question upon the basis of the needs and circumstances of that particular case. Now 
the whole object of the method I am bringing forward is not to get children arguing 
about the moral rules which should control the giving of charity-that is a relapse into 
the method of precepts against which I have protested. The object is to get them 
into the habit of mentally constructing some actual scene of human interaction, and 
of consulting them for instruction as to what to do. All the teacher’s questions and 
suggestions, therefore, must be directed toward aiding the pupil in building up in 
his imagination such a scene. To allow them to discuss what to do, save as relative to 
the development of some case, is to fall back into the very moral abstractions we are 
trying to avoid. So when children begin to argue (as they are almost sure to do) about 
the merits of some proposed plan of action, care must be taken not to let them argue 
it in general, but to introduce their ideas into the case under consideration so as to 
add new features and phases. The whole point, in a word, is to keep the mental eye 
constantly upon some actual situation or interaction: to realize in the imagination 
this or that particular needy person making his demand upon some particular person. 
It follows from this, of course, that the line of illustration chosen, that of charity, 
has no value in itself; it is taken simply as a basis with reference to which to get the 
child to fix his mind carefully upon the typical aspects of human interaction. The 
thought which underlies the method is that if instruction in the theory of morals has 
any practical value it has such value as it aids in forming, in the mind of the person 
taught, the habit of realizing for himself and in himself the nature of the practical 
situations in which he will find himself placed. The end of the method, then, is the 
formation of a sympathetic imagination for human relations in action; this is the ideal 
which is substituted for training in moral rules, or for analysis of one’s sentiments 
and attitudes in conduct.»
Dewey still considered himself an idealist, or more precisely an «experimental 
idealist» in 1893, although «generally favorable» references to James are beginning 
to appear in his writing,20 but the passage I have quoted is one he would still have 
endorsed after his conversion to pragmatism, and it seems to me to express, if not 
to explain in detail, a great deal of his later philosophical outlook. In 1893, how-
20 See the Introduction to The Early Works of John Dewey, vol. 4, by Wayne A. R. Leys, pp. iv-v. 
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ever, Dewey was still far from formulating that later outlook. The intuitions were, 
perhaps, already in place-certainly they are in place in this short article-but the later 
philosophical outlook as a whole, embracing, as it came to, aesthetics (Art as Experi-
ence), an account of human nature (Human Nature and Conduct), an account of sci-
entific method in Dewey’s generous sense of the term (Logic, the Theory of Inquiry), 
the 1908 Ethics and its revision in 1932, and much, much more almost eight million 
words, in fact! is obviously impossible to describe in detail in the present essay. But 
if one is going to focus on just a few aspects of Dewey’s philosophy, it seems to me 
that that Dewey’s suggestions as to how we might teach ethics to high school stu-
dents, namely, the refusal to identify ethics with a fixed set of rules and principles, 
the insistence that ethical problems are practical problems, and the belief that reason 
and emotion can and should work together and inform one another in approaching 
all practical problems, are insights that we need today and that are, alas! still often 
neglected in professional moral philosophy. 
A few concluding remarks
This essay is titled «the story of pragmatism». If your mental image of pragmatism 
was formed by reading Richard Rorty, this essay may have surprised you: I did not 
say, for example, as Rorty does, that pragmatists think that «warrant [is] a sociologi-
cal matter, to be ascertained by observing the reception of S’s [the speaker’s] state-
ment by her peers.»21 Warrant, or «warranted assertibility» is, as Rorty well knows, 
the central notion in Dewey’s account of the rational formation of belief, the account 
in Dewey’s Logic: the Theory of Inquiry, and nothing could have been farther from 
Dewey’s mind than the idea that warranted assertability is just a culture-relative 
matter, something to be ascertained by sociologists. I did not say, as Rorty also does, 
that for pragmatists calling some sentences true is just paying them a «compliment» 
because they «seem to be paying their way and fit in with other sentences which are 
doing so»22 The pragmatists were not cultural relativists about «warrant» and they 
all insisted that there was such a thing as truth and such a thing as reality, and that 
truths have to agree with reality. The problem, as James, puts it in Pragmatism23 is 
what «agreement» means, and he recognizes that that is a difficult metaphysical ques-
tion. But that a sentence can be «paying its way» and not be true is something he 
repeatedly points out. In fact, the idea that satisfactions (which is what Rorty means 
21 Richard Rorty, «Putnam and the Relativist Menace», Journal of Philosophy 60:9, 1993, pp. 443-461. The quota-
tion is from p, 449.
22 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1982, p.xxv. 
23 See Lecture 6 in Pragmatism, «Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth».
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by a belief ’s «paying its way») are sufficient for truth is explicitly listed as a «misun-
derstanding» of pragmatism by James in The Meaning of Truth.24 «Such anti-pragma-
tism as this,» James says, «seems to me a tissue of confusions. To begin with, when 
the pragmatist says ‘indispensable,’ it confounds this with ‘sufficient’. The pragma-
tist calls satisfactions indispensable for truth-building, but I have everywhere called 
them insufficient unless reality be also incidentally led to. If the reality assumed were 
cancelled from the pragmatist’s universe of discourse, he would straightway give the 
name falsehood to the beliefs remaining in spite of all their satisfactoriness.» 
But the clearest statement of James’s realism occurs in a letter to Dickinson Miller 
dated Aug. 5, 1906 in which James uses the following analogy:25
«The world per se may be likened to a cast of beans on a table. By themselves they spell 
nothing. An onlooker may grasp them as he likes. He may simply count them all and 
map them. He may select groups and name them capriciously, or name them to suit 
certain extrinsic purposes of his. What ever he does, so long as he takes account of them, 
his account is neither false nor irrelevant. If neither, why not call it true? It fits the beans-
minus him and expresses the total fact, of beans-plus-him.» 
In brief, the classical pragmatists may have had controversial theories about truth, 
reality, and warranted assertibility, but they took them seriously.
To sum up, I did not discuss James’s or Dewey’s views on truth and meaning in the 
present essay, except for denying that they are «Rortian». Instead, I focused on what I 
see as the central philosophical aim of these two great pragmatists, the aim of produc-
ing a philosophy which would do justice to our respect for science, and for fact in gen-
eral, as well as our humanistic values and concerns (and, in James’s case, our religious 
feelings). This does not mean that I want you to think of either James or Dewey as 
merely «public philosophers», and much less as «popular» philosophers. Rather, I see 
them as in the line of the great philosophers of the past who wanted philosophy to 
be simultaneously popular and technical, or better, to bring the best thought of their 
day, both inside and outside of technical philosophy, to bear on the question, «How 
to Live». I gave a brief account of the way in which Dewey left the Idealist movement 
which was so dominant in James’s time (that is the movement led by followers of He-
gel), and how he converted to pragmatism, becoming James’s great ally and, eventually, 
James’s successor. I emphasized that Dewey’s achievements as an educator were closely 
linked with his philosophical achievements; indeed, for Dewey every philosophical 
24 Cf. Chapter VIII of The Meaning of Truth, «The Pragmatist Account of Truth and its Misunderstanders», James’s 
reply to what he calls the fourth misunderstanding, 270 ff. The «fourth misunderstanding» is «No pragmatist can be 
a realist in his epistemology.».
25 The Letters of William James, edited by his son Henry James, The Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston, 1920, Vol. II, 
p. 295.
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idea worthy of respect makes some difference to education, and I gave an example of 
this from very early Dewey–«pre-pragmatist» Dewey, in fact–an 1893 article on teach-
ing ethics to high school students. 
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